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Care and the Self: A Philosophical Perspective on Constructing Active 
Masculinities 
Iva Apostolova and Élaina Gauthier-Mamaril 
Abstract 
Our paper focuses on the philosophical perspective of constructing active (as 
opposed to reactive) caring masculine agencies in the contemporary feminist 
discourse. Since contemporary feminisms are not simply anti-essentialist but, more 
importantly, polyphonic, we believe that it is far more appropriate to talk about 
‘masculinities’ as opposed to ‘masculinity.’ We are proposing a revised 
understanding of the self in which the self is not defined primarily in the 
dichotomous, categorical one-other relationship. We use Paul Ricoeur’s 
anthropology to describe the self as relational, as well as Joan Tronto’s recent 
perspective on care, which fits well with a Ricoeurian reconstruction of the self. We 
also engage with Raewyn Connell’s discourse on masculinity and, more specifically, 
hegemonic masculinity. By using ‘caring masculine agencies’ as an alternative to 
‘masculinity as reactive anti-femininity,’ we are proposing a paradigm shift that 
hopefully is flexible enough to respect the dynamism inherent to any act of gender-
identification. 
Keywords: hegemonic masculinities, reactive masculinities, active/caring 
masculinities, ethics of care, relational self 
Our research aims at opening a new narrative space for masculinity within a 
feminist context. More specifically, we will focus on the philosophical perspective of 
constructing caring masculine agencies that would be active (as opposed to reactive) 
in the contemporary feminist discourse. Since contemporary feminisms are not 
simply anti-essentialist but, more importantly, polyphonic, we believe that it is far 
more appropriate to talk about ‘masculinities’ in the plural, as opposed to 
‘masculinity’ in the singular.1 We believe that as far as the masculinity discourse is 
1 We accept R. W. Connell’s understanding of masculinities as “socially constructed 
configurations of gender practice” (Connell 2005a, 1805). 
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concerned, it is already embedded in the feminist discourse.2 However, this 
discourse has often been described as a reactive type of masculinity, a masculinity 
entrenched in the dialogue, or the lack thereof, between the categorical ‘one’ and 
‘other’ (sex), where the ‘other’ has been defined either more radically, as exclusively 
‘feminine’ and underprivileged, or more moderately, as standing in an opposition to 
the ‘one.’ We believe that it is time to revise the classical feminist discourse of the 
‘one-other’ relationship with the hope of moving away from it and constructing new 
masculinities which are not (still) anchored in a discourse of power.  
In light of this, we would like to propose a revised understanding of the self 
in which the self is not defined primarily in the dichotomous, categorical one-other 
relationship. We will use Paul Ricoeur’s work to describe the self as not only 
narrative but, more importantly, relational. While we fully recognize the richness of 
the literature on relationality (relational ontology), we have chosen Paul Ricoeur’s 
perspective of the self for two main reasons. First, and also practically, Joan Tronto, 
whom we use extensively in our paper, herself engages in a dialogue with Ricoeur’s 
anthropology. Second, we feel that bringing in a thinker who is entrenched in the 
continental tradition, however tentative the divide may be, increases the 
intersectionality of the analysis which is, we are convinced, necessary for the 
purposes of constructing the possibility for caring masculine agencies. In taking 
relational ontology as our starting point, we thus recognize that relationships with 
others are essential for the existence of the self. Thus, we will argue that the self is 
constituted in and through relationship with others. This relational picture of the 
self necessitates a new discourse involving the notion of care at its center. We will 
use Joan Tronto’s recent works where she proposes a new perspective on care 
which, we find, fits well with a Ricoeurian reconstruction of the self. Tronto 
advocates a structural approach to care (as opposed to treating care as a personal 
attitude only) where care is viewed as “a species activity that includes everything 
that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as 
well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all 
of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web” (Tronto 2013, 19). 
We share Tronto’s belief that until we transform our social and political power 
practices into caring practices, where all institutions are reformed to embody the 
care for the ‘life-sustaining web’ built by the self and its relationships, including to 
itself, we cannot really hope to live peacefully and democratically as equals. This 
                                                          
2 We use the term ‘masculinity discourse’ loosely here but with emphasis on how 
masculinity has been handled in the feminist academic literature. This would point 
in the direction of “masculine domination” and “modes of thinking that are 
themselves products of millennia of masculine domination,” “the historical social 
structures of masculine rule” as Pierre Bourdieu calls it (Bourdieu 1996–1997, 191).  
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transformation requires, among other things, redefining such key concepts as 
agency, autonomy, and vulnerability, all intimately connected to the ‘ethics of 
responsibility.’ We thus hope to show that although the relational self is gender-
informed (we do not limit the genders to two), it is free to engage in various 
feminine as well as masculine discourses and behaviors all at once.  
The paper follows a ‘backward’ tripartite structure in which we gradually 
build up to the discussion of active masculinities. We first expose what we believe is 
the best normative platform for constructing active masculinities. We make a case 
for ethics of care as the alternative normative platform of choice in which the 
(moral) agent is interpreted as a caring agent. We believe that, on the one hand, 
ethics of care pairs well with another type of alternative normative ethics platform, 
such as virtue ethics, in that both of them put at the center the self/agency as 
opposed to various principles of action. We consider it an advantage for the ability 
of a normative theory to co-operate, as it were, with another normative theory. On 
the other hand, ethics of care leads directly to relational ontology in which the 
self/agent is constructed relationally (as our construction of a Ricoeur-inspired 
relational self will illustrate), as opposed to dichotomously, for example. It is in this 
nondichotomous milieu that we think active masculinities can be successfully 
constructed and sustained. It needs to be noted at the outset that what we mean by 
active masculinities is caring masculinities, a term which will be put together as the 
very last stage of the paper, on the backdrop of Connell’s discussion of “hegemonic 
masculinity.”3 
 
Care as Structure: Noddings’s Model of Care 
In her 1984 seminal work, Nel Noddings argued that it is care, which we are 
all born into, and not duty, that is at the base of ethical behavior. We have chosen 
Noddings’s version of ethics of care as we very much sympathize with her effort to 
build an alternative bottom-up normative ethics which kills many birds with one 
stone, as it were. Our sympathy is based on two main merits the discussion of her 
theory brings to our project. First, it shows how ethics of care can, in fact, function 
as an alternative normative ethical system, one with heightened sensitivity to 
gender issues. And second, the Noddings-Tronto debate is not only exemplary in 
that it allows us to see the carving up of a normative ethical model in action, so to 
speak, but it also leads us to a new and, we believe, highly potent (from a 
theoretical point of view) consideration of care, namely, care as structure. We 
believe that it is care as structure that holds the key to proposing a different model 
of looking at types of masculinities within the gendered self. Put otherwise, we 
believe that, if we accept the platform of ethics of care where the agent/self is 
                                                          
3 See Connell 2005a, 2005b.  
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formed and continuously ‘evaluated’ in relation to all other agents/selves, we will 
comfortably make the transition to considering the agent/self as a polyphonous 
gendered self. 
 
Tronto: Care as Structure 
Joan Tronto was one of the early critics of Noddings’s ethics of care. Tronto, 
along with disability scholars such as Sunaura Taylor (2014) and Christine Kelly 
(2013), cautions that even under ideal circumstances, care as a moral attitude poses 
problems. Care is often asymmetrical and labor intensive; it requires a constant 
displacement of one’s self in order to meet the needs of the other. Under Taylor and 
Kelly’s criticism of care, we need to be mindful of the possibility of using care for the 
construction of just another ableist picture of justice.  
But if we interpret care as a structure, as opposed to a moral attitude, as 
Tronto ends up doing, we are bound to accept relational ontology, and we can at 
least map out various forms of formal and informal care practices on the basis of 
which different public policies can be built. (It is a long-standing criticism of Tronto’s 
that Nodding’s platform of care has difficulties being applied outside the family 
structure.) Although the logic of care is in direct opposition to the logic of 
domination, applying the former will require a close look at things like 
purposiveness, politics, particularity, and plurality (Tronto 2010, 162). The bottom 
line is that the logic of care requires a constant negotiation of the ends of care, the 
relationship between the existing power relations and care relations, as well as 
reconciling the needs of diverse populations. Since care structure is intimately linked 
to recognizing and catering to the needs of groups and individuals in a unique way, 
as opposed to a standardized way, it is paramount that the complex—and often 
fraught with ambiguity and vagueness—discourse of determining needs (as opposed 
to, or in conjunction with, wants) is taken seriously. This realization presents us with 
a model whose complexity and multidimensionality are further amplified by the fact 
that the model itself is to be constantly renegotiated in real time. The requirement 
of renegotiation makes us aware that care is, in fact, a process of caring. In other 
words, if we want to understand care as a process and not a commodity, it is 
inadequate to appeal to an a priori organizational purpose, or to cater to the desire 
of holism, which is, no doubt, imbedded in care itself. To make sense of the 
complexity of care as structure, we need to ask: How does the institution 
understand and negotiate its own needs? How is the effectiveness of care 
evaluated? How are the responsibilities within the organization allocated?  
We suppose that relational responsibility does away with a substantive 
account of responsibility under which we abide by a formal set of relationship 
properties which entail each other. Thus, a given community, in caring for the 
relationships which are immediately formed among its members, will try to refine 
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the understanding of the moral beliefs, extend the consensus, and eliminate the 
conflict where this is possible. Along the same lines, accepting the logic of care does 
not, in fact, allow us to ignore the existing power structures. This is especially true 
for placing care in a global context. While it remains a brute fact that we are born 
and live for the duration of our lives in relationships, which creates various degrees 
of dependence among the members of a given community, we cannot ignore 
another fact, namely, that relationships imminently carry power differentials. Failing 
to understand this, as Tronto puts it, creates moral harm ‘on its face’ (Tronto 2012, 
313). The understanding that new relationships develop within the network of 
existing ones (which exist within a communal framework) should tip us off that 
relationships are ever-growing complexities, and understanding them means 
understanding the dynamics, including the power dynamics, within them. It is this 
tension between care structure and power structure that will be explored in a 
subsequent section of this paper, where we will map out a possible new model of 
constructing active/caring masculinities. But before we get there, we need to shed 
more light on what we mean by the relational self, since it will be the relational self 
that acts as a springboard for caring masculinities. 
 
The Relational Self: From Oneself as Another to Caring Masculine Agencies 
The idem and the ipse: Ricoeur’s Attempt at Shifting the Understanding of Selfhood 
Our proposed perspective on caring masculine agencies fits well, we find, 
with Ricoeur’s anthropological model of the self. After expounding briefly on 
Ricoeur’s model of the self, we will respond to Tronto’s objections to using 
Ricoeurian anthropology in ethics of care. We are hoping to shed light on the fact 
that both can be used in conjunction to open up a post-dialectical, or a post-binary, 
perspective on identity and selfhood to show that, if there is always tension with 
otherness, that otherness is (a) not always exterior to ourselves and (b) does not 
always come neatly in pairs, but is, most of the time, invested in a complex web. 
In the introduction to Oneself as Another, Ricoeur expresses his endeavour 
to move away from an atemporal understanding of the self as an isolated and 
immediate ‘I,’, as a subject that can in turn either be over-evaluated or under-
evaluated. By introducing otherness as constitutive of one’s own identity, Ricoeur 
draws attention to the mediated and relational quality of selfhood. By proposing the 
overarching dialectic of “on one side, identity as sameness (Latin idem, German 
Glechkeit, French mêmeté); on the other, identity as selfhood (Latin ipse, German 
Selbstheit, French ipséité),” Ricoeur attempts to explain how we, in fact, live the 
tension between the continuity and the discontinuity of our temporal existence 
(Ricoeur 1992, 1). While sameness allows us to account for our permanence in time, 
selfhood structures the internal discontinuities that arise from the fact that we live 
in spatial-temporal contexts that include a variety of discontinuous events. For 
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Ricoeur, we make sense of this tension through narrativity, by constructing and 
telling our life story within a social order and a web of relationships.  
 
The Autonomous/Vulnerable Self 
Ricoeur’s narrative construction of selfhood through time allows him to 
introduce agency as the playing of multiple roles. For example, just as identity is 
never divorced from otherness, for Ricoeur, autonomy is never dissociated from 
vulnerability. Translated into a context of ethics of care, this means that each 
individual has the capacity to both receive and give care. It is also important to note 
that, just as otherness is never only an external opposition to the self, autonomy 
and vulnerability are not polar opposites whose respective powers wane as the 
other’s grows stronger. It is tempting to conceive of autonomy as belonging to a self 
with a greater degree of agency that is as invulnerable as it can be, yet: 
 
For Ricoeur, however, the two notions are bound together inseparably. Each 
form of autonomy has a corresponding figure of fragility (i.e., vulnerability) 
(76). Autonomy needs the experience of vulnerability: it turns autonomy 
from a general supposition into a task to be performed. The highest form of 
autonomy, then, does not consist in the vindication of vulnerability, but in 
the mediation of both notions in the social order. (Hettema 2014, 496) 
 
Therefore, when evaluating selfhood, we cannot abstract ideas of activity from ideas 
of passivity, or notions of power from notions of powerlessness. As beings capable of 
reflecting on their own constructed selfhood, all humans experience these tensions 
at the very core of what we consider to be our own ‘identity.’ 
Our narrative must be open to criticism and challenges. Identifying with 
different masculinities, for example, is never only an autonomous-invulnerable 
choice, but is always also the result of various instances of vulnerability within each 
individual. Thus, by proposing a perspective on caring masculine agencies, we are 
not positioning ourselves against what could be regarded as ‘substantial’ qualities of 
hegemonic masculinity such as power and autonomy. Rather, if agency is 
inseparable from passivity, this necessitates that we include people who identify 
themselves within the masculinities spectrum without exhibiting ‘substantial’ 
masculine qualities, or in addition, and even on the contrary, exhibiting ‘substantial’ 
feminine qualities. This means not only that they are capable of providing care as 
opposed to forcefully oppressing (taking care), but also that they need to receive 
care for themselves. Thus, caring masculine agencies must also imply caring 
masculine passivities. A philosophical approach to discourses about masculinities 
can therefore propose a complex relational model of selfhood that could encourage 
meta-dialectical considerations of gender identification. We recognise that this kind 
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of identification happens within social structures, and that is why we believe that 
structural practices of care can inform and be informed, in turn, by the relational 
construct that is selfhood. This statement, however, cannot be made without 
reservations and we must acknowledge that Tronto herself raises issues with the use 
of any kind of philosophical anthropology as a basis for an alternative normative 
ethics (i.e., ethics of care). We will address these issues next. 
 
Responding to Tronto’s “Practices All the Way Up” Objection to the Ricoeurian 
Anthropology 
By conceiving of care ethics from a structural, care-about point of view, 
Tronto and her coauthors advocate for a “practices all the way up” approach to 
ethics that builds upon the moral questions that arise from caring practices as 
supposed to being deduced from moral theories (Tronto, van Nistelrooij, and 
Schaafsma 2014, 489). They are wary of using any specific philosophical 
anthropology as a foundation, including Ricoeur’s, because any anthropological 
foundation will inevitably exclude other diverging accounts of human beings and 
their relationships and should therefore not be used as the basis for a normative 
ethics. However, it is our position that Tronto’s project of structural care, especially 
with its emphasis on the relational and nested qualities of care, is not incompatible 
with Ricoeur’s exploration of the autonomous/vulnerable self. On the contrary, the 
possibilities that Ricoeur’s anthropology opens up are rather amenable to a 
“practices all the way up” approach. 
First, Tronto, van Nistelrooij, and Schaafsma stress the fact that “caring 
practices are always contextual and relational” (2014, 489). This relationality is what 
Ricoeur puts forward in his analysis of the construction of selfhood. He multiplies 
the dialectics (idem/ipse, sufferer/agent), but we believe that this can be opened up 
into a horizon in which strict dialectical poles are not the only way to make sense of 
the selfhood landscape. By highlighting how dialectical tensions within an individual 
are always intertwined with external relationships and oppositions, we maintain 
that Ricoeur, while not completely abandoning binary concept couplings, frames 
selfhood in a less rigid and decisively nonlinear way. Thus, using Ricoeur’s 
anthropological framework to conceive of various dynamic practices and fluid 
conceptions of the self would not be committing hermeneutical heresy, and neither 
would it preclude us from expanding its foundation. 
Second, Tronto and her coauthors underline the nested quality of caring 
practices that can be related to the embedded quality of the self, as per Ricoeur’s 
theory. One could object that the difference that Tronto et al. claim between 
practices and theories still holds in this case; however, we do not think that the 
analogy should be so easily dismissed. As a reflexive construct, the self evolves in 
space and time, in relation to other individuals as well as to institutions. Thus, when 
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Tronto et al. claim that the ends of individual caring practices are parts of larger, 
institutional and societal care practices, we are convinced that they are echoing 
Ricoeur’s assertion that the self is narratively constructed not only in contact with 
other individuals, but also with institutional and societal discourses. It is, therefore, 
not incongruous that we turn to both Tronto and Ricoeur in trying to understand 
what kind of philosophical discourse contributes the most to evaluating and, 
subsequently, constructing conceptions of masculinities. 
 
Caring Masculine Agencies: The Philosophy Angle 
When we were researching this paper, our main concern was to reflect on 
what a philosophical approach had to offer to a discourse on masculinities. Such a 
discourse is a reflection on the ‘form,’ on the ‘act’ of identification and self-
identification. Both our readings in the sociology of masculinity and in feminist 
philosophy have pointed out the somewhat common-sense negative definition of 
masculinity as anti-femininity. We, therefore, approached the definition of 
masculinity/ies as a question about whether it would be possible to shift this inquiry 
outside the binary, dialectical power polarity, and what this ‘outside’ would look 
like. In addition to our choice of ethics of care as the most appropriate normative 
ethical system, Ricoeur’s anthropological account of the mediated, constructed self, 
although still employing dialectical couples, provides another platform from which 
we believe conceiving of a post-polarized perspective on masculinities is made 
possible. We have termed this perspective ‘caring masculine agencies.’ We would 
like to attempt an explanation of what we mean by that, knowing full well that we 
will not exhaust the subject in any shape or form. 
 
Shifting from Reactive/Active to Caring Masculinities 
As we have already discussed, when considering the relationality of the self, 
one of the consequences of defining selfhood as constructed by the mediation of 
our relationships with others, with social environments and institutions, is that it is 
no longer possible to think of it in terms of strict dichotomies. For example, 
autonomy and vulnerability are not to be conceived as being mutually exclusive or 
to be impermeable to one another, but rather as being bound together to better 
represent human lived experiences from the point of view of being simultaneously 
an agent and a sufferer. Furthermore, we can take away from Tronto’s critical 
appraisal of ethics of care that a care structure on a social and political level would 
understand care in a broader sense and, therefore, allow for the construction of 
caring masculine agencies that do not necessarily need to position themselves as 
being feminine or anti-feminine, since the existential reality of the “need for care” 
has been “redistributed” to all humans, regardless of gender. From this premise of 
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care as a socio-political structure, the self-defining, identity-building value of 
“consideration” can be derived. 
If the notion of care can enable us, through normative precepts, to recognise 
the otherness in ourselves and the constant inner tension between autonomy and 
vulnerability, we propose that we can draw from it an ethical attitude of 
consideration. To be considerate within a caring framework is to enact one of the 
instantiations of care. It is an attitude, a posture that one can adopt to perform the 
awareness and affirmation of the self, and as such, it is a fruitful way of showcasing 
how active masculinities could be formed. To be considerate in this way means to 
practice the dual exercise of assessing our capabilities and vulnerabilities and 
becoming aware of the capabilities and the vulnerabilities of others in order to act 
upon this knowledge. It is not self-effacement, as we do have consideration for 
ourselves, but neither is it an exclusionary and atomistic affirmation of self. When 
the agent is considerate in her actions, she makes an effort to not only assert herself 
in the world, but also to understand how she is of the world. Within the caring 
framework that reminds us all of our co-constructed identities that need to draw 
upon our environment (physical and socio-political), consideration may seem a tad 
pragmatic, but we believe it is a useful way of grounding the social skills that are 
necessary to enact care, such as the skill to negotiate the self–other landscape. 
We do acknowledge that opening a dialogue between masculinity and 
femininity is a good strategy to expose the fluidity of gender as well as its significant 
influence on institution formation. However, what we believe is even better, is 
placing masculinities in the context of care interpreted as a structure of thinking, 
conversing, and socializing. We believe that, through care, a very important aspect 
of social practices is brought about, namely considerate negotiation. Negotiation 
requires relational ontology as well as acting, as opposed to merely observing and 
analyzing. In other words, we believe that the use of the model of care as structure 
can be expanded further. (So far, we have seen in the literature the model of care 
being used to redefine the human–animal relationship in ecofeminist scholarship, or 
to criticize the existing capitalist socio-economic model, as Tronto does.) On the one 
hand, it offers what Lorraine Code (1991) calls “mitigated relativism,” under which a 
middle ground is opened up where the creative tension between the personal and 
collective experiences and histories, material circumstances, and social structures is 
maintained without precluding an open dialogue (320). On the other hand, care 
retains a form of normativity necessary for the creation and functioning of social 
practices, without turning it into rigid normativity under which “the unwarranted 
assumption that role and identity correspond” threatens to set us back to the 
dialectical-dichotomous-adversarial framework of reactive masculinity (and reactive 
femininity) (Connell 2005b, 70).  
9
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In order to better flesh out what we propose as active or caring 
masculinities, we would like to relate our discussion to Connell’s seminal notion of 
“hegemonic masculinity” (Connell 2005b). We echo Connell and Messerschmidt’s 
concern that despite the many transformations of hegemonic masculinity as the 
main social factor in proliferating the domination of men over women, it is, today, 
still an active practice, despite its immense internal complexity (Connell and 
Messerschmidt 2005, 846). The rise of many men’s rights movements around the 
world over the past decades has done little for abolishing gender hierarchies. On the 
contrary, as Connell aptly points out elsewhere, it seemed to have triggered a wave 
of neoconservative and antifeminist politics (Connell 2005a, 1806).4 It seems that 
hegemonic masculinity, along with gender itself, has become more fluid but, 
because of that, also more insidious. For example, instead of resorting to forms of 
violence, mainstream media uses commercial sports to celebrate “force, 
domination, and competitive success,” all unmistakably hegemonic masculine traits 
(1816). What is more, the visible mechanisms of hegemony, often masked as 
positive parading of culturally acceptable virtues, are accompanied by invisible ones 
where the hegemonic masculinity is “withdrawn from scrutiny,” as in the many 
cases of media reports of US high school shootings witnessed over the past decade 
                                                          
4 To illustrate Connell’s point, we would like to mention a 2016 documentary, The 
Red Pill, directed by Cassie Jaye. The documentary, which has enjoyed high ratings 
since its release and could be considered to represent a perception of feminism in 
mainstream US pop culture, follows the young director’s own personal encounter 
with some of the men’s rights movements in the US. The documentary ends with 
Ms. Jaye’s confession that she no longer considers herself a feminist. While we 
believe that the documentary is honest in its intention to present the views on both 
sides of the gender equality fence, what we found to be a glaring gap was a lack of 
critical reflection on the types of male voices heard in the documentary. While a 
certain slant is every artist’s privilege, a consideration for the situatedness of the 
male, and female for that matter, voices heard is of paramount importance when 
dealing with gender equality issues. And so, instead of enabling men’s rights activists 
to speak on behalf of all men, an emphasis on the specific vulnerabilities that some 
men face in contemporary US society, would have rendered a much more sensitive 
and honest approach to the topic. As Connell successfully observes, “In the domain 
of power, men collectively control the institutions of coercion and the means of 
violence (e.g., weapons). But men are also the main targets of military violence and 
criminal assaults. . . . The disadvantages listed above are, broadly speaking, the 
conditions of the advantages” (Connell 2005a, 1809). “Equally important,” Connell 
continues, “the men who receive most of the benefits and the men who pay most of 
the costs are not the same individuals” (1806). 
10
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(Connell and Messerschmidt 2005, 835). We take Connell’s point that the notion of 
alliance (between the genders) is really important, both theoretically and practically, 
for achieving gender equality (Connell 2005a, 1817). We believe that the concept of 
alliance is founded upon the notion of considerate negotiation, itself based on the 
ethical attitude of consideration, mentioned above.5 To go even further, while 
sidestepping most of the accumulated criticisms of hegemonic masculinity with 
which Connell and Messerschmidt diligently engage, we would like to single out one 
concern that active/caring masculinities can help with (Connell and Messerschmidt 
2005, 836–845).  
We agree with S. M. Whitehead’s criticism of hegemonic masculinity as an 
obfuscating concept which results in an “abstract structural dynamics” that does not 
take into consideration the fluidity of masculinities but instead tries to fit them into 
an overarching structure of sorts (Whitehead 2002, 94). Put otherwise, hegemonic 
masculinity can be shown to result in “structural determinism” that erases the 
subject, a stance with which Connell and Messerschmidt “flatly disagree” (Connell 
and Messerschmidt 2005, 843). It seems to us that what Connell and Messerschmidt 
propose in response to Whitehead’s criticism is an intersectional (without using the 
term itself) analysis of masculinity, supported by various social and historical studies 
of gender. While intersectionality in gender study is indispensable, we worry that 
intersectional analysis might remain too local (and hence, partial) to be of use, 
especially on a global scale. We believe that the concept of active/caring 
masculinities might just provide the structural unity for dealing with all existing 
ambiguities and tensions that are part and parcel of the process of understanding 
gender dynamics and, subsequently, for dealing with existing or anticipated conflicts 
among various masculinities and femininities. The notion of active/caring 
masculinities would not threaten to lead to structural determinism which obscures 
and/or erases the self because it has imbedded in it the requirement of ongoing 
critical evaluation and reevaluation of the notions of agency, autonomy, and 
(gender) identity. We believe that of all existing normative models, the one 
grounded in care is the most promising in the sense of being the most flexible and 
non-content-imposing. In other words, gender analysis focused on practices of care 
has the potential of bringing together various forms of femininities and masculinities 
in a decisively nondichotomous way. Thus, it seems to us that an emphasis on 
constructing active/caring masculinities could serve the purpose of uniting, without 
homogenizing, the empirical analysis of hegemonic masculinity on the three levels 
described by Connell and Messerschmidt, namely local, regional, and global (849). 
                                                          
5 Connell seems to refer to care almost exclusively in the sphere of domestic 
practices, if at all. This seems to relegate care to a practice that has a rather narrow 
reach (see Connell 2005a). 
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At the same time, an emphasis on care would not only not exclude the social 
embodiment discourse, but quite on the contrary, encourage it (851–852). Care for 
one’s self implies care for one’s body. Care for the body, mine and the other’s, is 
necessitated by the understanding of one’s vulnerabilities. It is precisely because the 
self is both autonomous and vulnerable that it requires care. 
This means that a model of active masculinity—and, indeed, of any gender-
identification—starts with recognizing what is common to all individuals: their 
inescapable and constitutive relationality and, therefore, their need for care and 
their capacity to care for one another. This does not mean that genders are, or even 
should be, undifferentiated. It simply directs the crafting of (self)-identification from 
the common-to-the-individual self via the acknowledgement of differences, as 
opposed to the more strictly dichotomous position that the differences between 
individual people trump their relational situation and place them into binary 
categories that only produce social sense if they are diametrically opposed to one 
another. In broad strokes, we could say that while passive or reactive masculinities 
focus on digging a trench that promptly divides up masculinity from femininity, 
active masculinities pick their own unique style of building on the ground they share 
with femininities and other gender-identifications. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
As history has shown all too well, if ‘masculinity’ is interpreted in an 
essentialist way, it can easily lead to ideology. The connection between masculinity, 
power, and domination is all too evident to be lost on feminist thinkers. We believe, 
however, that the same goes for reactive masculinities. If masculinity is always 
interpreted dialectically in opposition to femininity, then the diversity of 
masculinities recognized within a given social context will not help the case since, at 
the end of the day, all of the different masculinities will be placed in opposition to all 
the different femininities. Diversifying masculinity will not end the process of 
creating masculine institutions, for example, even if women are employed in them. 
As Todd Reeser (2010, 20) aptly points out, “Various institutions clearly have self-
interest in masculinity: the government needs soldiers to defend itself, so it 
produces military masculinity; the business world needs a capitalistic masculinity to 
make money, so it makes its version of gender appear ideal.”  
We deliberately kept the unconventional plural of ‘agency’ to emphasise 
even more what we understand to be the plural and multifaceted way that an 
individual chooses to identify as “masculine.” Once more basing ourselves on Tronto 
and Connell, we believe that a theoretical discourse on masculinities must 
acknowledge that this concept is made up of ‘practices’ that must continue to 
inform its definition dynamically, as opposed to categorically. That is why we 
propose the integration within a discourse on masculinities of the general structures 
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of care as well as of the relational self. We believe that it could not only be a first 
step outside the anti-femininity paradigm towards a more active and positive 
definition, but also it could propose a viable alternative to some of the issues that 
Connell’s notion of hegemonic masculinity encounters or responds to. Furthermore, 
as structures, these philosophical options do not prescribe strict normative content 
but rather place the agent within a normative environment in which it can grow, 
change, and evolve. By using ‘caring masculine agencies’ as an alternative to 
‘masculinity as reactive anti-femininity,’ we are proposing a paradigm shift that 
hopefully is flexible enough to respect the dynamism inherent to any act of gender-
identification. 
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